

# ESSAY The Second Cold War

By William Safire

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WASHINGTON, Jan. 9 — "Détente is dead. The Second Cold War is under way."

Those words, which led this space exactly four years ago, caused the usual cluck-clucking at our Department of State. To recognize the death of détente was then considered the mark of "an unreconstructed hawk," which is presumably even worse than a reconstructed hawk.

Today, hawkishness of whatever construction is all the rage. Perhaps it began "as a little cloud out of the sea, like a man's hand" when George McGovern talked of sending troops to Cambodia; it grew when Frank Church pointed with alarm to the presence of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, and mushroomed in frustration during our humiliation in Iran.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, encouraged by our show of weakness and indecision about Iran, put hawkishness over the top. President Carter went on national television to say that he had been born yet again: "My opinion of the Russians has changed more drastically in the last week than even the previous two-and-a-half years."

Though its syntax was garbled, that was the most revealing and damaging admission of his term. Because the Soviet leader — who only last year had kissed him in Vienna — lied about Afghanistan, the scales have fallen from Mr. Carter's eyes. He now sees the true Soviet colors. The foreign policy of the Carter Administration has been based on a false premise.

That false premise was that the Soviet Union "shared," in Secretary Vance's trendy phrase, America's vision of a peaceful world. Forget that rosy glow; the President had been lied to — on the hot line, no less — and he took that as a personal insult. End of SALT, end of trade, end of soft-line foreign policy rhetoric.

Carter Administration doves have run for cover. Cyrus Vance has been all but replaced by spokesman Hodding Carter, who is more adept at ex-

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pressing frustration threateningly; Marshall Shulman, the gentle professor planning our Soviet policy, has been eclipsed; Paul Warnke, the main accommodator of SALT, has long since dropped from sight. The only dove with access to the President is counsel Lloyd Cutler.

Now Zbigniew Brzezinski strides the stage. For three years he has been the mirror-image of Lyndon Johnson's George Ball — given a hearing but rarely heeded. He lost the B-1 bomber, was rejected on the neutron bomb, helplessly watched the scuttling of the U.S. Navy, was overruled on helping the Shah and on applying greater pressure against the Cubans. Too late, he is being asked for too little.

Mr. Carter, who was admittedly mistaken about Soviet intentions throughout his Presidency, now turns to the hawks for quick fixes. Having lost the geopolitical lead in the fourth quarter, Mr. Carter sends in a new team to play catch-up ball.

The hawks cannot refuse to try. Some of us are urging that we turn the Iranian provocation to free-world advantage by responding with a unilateral blockade and a multilateral alliance to protect the Arabian peninsula; others, like Mr. Brzezinski, are trying to use Mideast anger at the invasion of Afghanistan as a means toward making friends with the govern-

ment in Iran that will follow the Khomeini regime. (That's why the terrorists holding the embassy are being branded as Soviet-influenced, and why in Administration statements, the phrase "the honor and interests of the United States" is now being placed before "the safety of the hostages.")

But what of the doves? Do they take positions only in retrospect? Here we are, beginning to press arms on Pakistan's General Zia, who has been denied them by Mr. Carter because he is probably building an atomic weapon financed by Libya. General Zia, who executed former Prime Minister Ali Bhutto, is somewhat more repressive than was President Thieu of South Vietnam. But we hear not a peep from those who denounced "corrupt dictators" who were our allies.

Hawks think we should be arming General Zia to the teeth, and should be buying Soviet Kalashnikov rifles on the black market to send him for transshipment to the Afghan resistance. (Pity we cannot make as good a rifle.) Not because we like his way of governing, but because he could give our enemies some trouble, and help stop the Soviet reach toward the Persian Gulf.

Evidently, Mr. Carter belatedly agrees; but does Ted Kennedy agree? Or is he waiting to complain later?

In the same way, the Carter Administration is likely to try to get Congress to reduce the number of committees with access to C.I.A. secrets. Hawks think that a C.I.A. capable of doing what Leonid Brezhnev falsely accuses it of doing would offer a useful alternative to direct military intervention. Has Vice President Mondale, who helped eviscerate the C.I.A.'s covert capability, now changed his mind?

Hawks made themselves heard when hawkishness was out of style; now that the Soviet embrace of "the war process" has caused even Mr. Carter to reassess his naïve policies, it would be good for doves to speak out about Cold War II while hard decisions are being made.